Need for common ground in diplomacy, national security

At the core of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s diplomatic strategy is a shift away from strategic ambiguity toward values-based diplomacy. This is an inevitable choice imposed on South Korea by the current security environment defined by the new Sino-American Cold War and the worsening nuclear threat of North Korea. A dual structure of trilateral alliances between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan on the one hand, and North Korea, China and Russia on the other, has emerged in Northeast Asia over the issues of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan.

Evaluation of Yoon’s presidency in its first year in office is varied and polarized. Unlike domestic economic and social policy arenas, diplomatic and national security are matters that can more immediately and decisively affect the fate of a country. Both advocates and critics of the Yoon government in this regard are so obsessed with their own political and ideological interests that they do not approach debate on these issues with the protection of the overall national interest at heart.

The divisions in South Korean society, wrought by its turbulent history, (which has witnessed war, revolution, coups, rapid economic growth, democratization and economic polarization) have eradicated any common ground that could unite all members of its political community. In addition to the mundane South Korean politics of chronic division and “all or nothing” arguments, the media environment also fuels and deepens this polarization.

Any differences that may have existed between traditional public and commercial (“mainstream”) broadcasters and new media such as YouTube and other social media platforms have virtually disappeared; instead, they are merely competing with each other for attention. These media outlets, perhaps looking after their commercial interests, tend to select guests for debates on current affairs who are known for their political biases and polemical stances. A recent radio panelist who is a supporter of the current opposition party and has regularly opposed the idea of South Korea obtaining its own nuclear weapons abruptly criticized the Yoon administration for giving up South Korea’s possible nuclear armament after the Washington Declaration was announced. This ridiculous episode is but one example of many in South Korea’s increasingly polarized media environment.

South Korean society’s prevailing biased and distorted perceptions on diplomatic and national security matters are well illustrated by the vastly different attitudes toward the problem of North Korea’s nuclear threat and the building of constructive relations with Japan.

Above all, pro-opposition party commentators do not seem to perceive North Korea’s nuclear threat as imminent or serious. Jeong Se-hyun, the former unification minister during the Roh Moo-hyun government who often appears in progressive-oriented YouTube videos, says that South Korea should not bet everything on cooperation with the U.S. and Japan to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, given its long history and complicated power relations in Northeast Asia. However, he fails to address what should be done about China and Russia, both of which have stubbornly refused to cooperate with the U.N. Security Council on sanctioning North Korea.

At the same time, pro-ruling party panelists only praise Yoon’s sophisticated manners, friendliness, and a speech delivered in English to the U.S. Congress during his state visit, while not addressing his drastic miscalculation in giving up the country’s right to possible nuclear armament, let alone his failure to revise the nuclear energy pact with the U.S. so that South Korea could reprocess nuclear fuel, as Japan does. They seem to ignore the distinction between a more positive stance toward engagement with the U.S. on security matters, which is no doubt a good thing, and concessions that could lead to an effective U.S. takeover of South Korea’s national security capabilities.

In regards to Japan, no matter how much the Yoon administration has tried to explain that it frames its diplomatic policy in the spirit of the 1998 Kim Dae-jung—Keizo Obuchi joint declaration in order to build future-oriented mutual relations, pro-opposition party panelists will never acknowledge it. The president’s role is one in which he must face “reality” from the moment he takes office and he bears great responsibility for state affairs. A president is, after all, the public servant of the people and should look forward rather than backward. It does not make sense for historical conflicts to prevent the president from engaging in close cooperation with Japan in the present on such important issues as security and economic affairs.

Pro-opposition panelists, however, dismiss such efforts to improve ties with Japan as mere shameful and subservient diplomacy. The third-party reimbursement plan endorsed by Yoon’s government may not be a perfect solution to compensating the victims of forced labor under Japanese colonial rule, yet it might be the best way available for South Korea, in light of international law. Meanwhile, pro-Yoon commentators fail to point out that the Yoon administration and the ruling party were hasty in handling this third-party reimbursement plan and did not do enough to win broader domestic public support.

The proliferation and deepening of biased perceptions of polarized factions according to partisan rather than national interests have had a detrimental influence on the formation of public opinion, even in areas of diplomacy and national security. This presents a serious challenge as internecine bickering can cause society to overlook issues of greater importance in dealing with the harsh geopolitical conditions facing South Korea today.

Even if the “existential determination of thought” may be an unavoidable limitation that affects us all, as the sociologist Karl Mannheim argued, the current flood of biased and distorted ideas in South Korea’s media can still be diluted by the spread of voices of intellectuals who are encouraged to be as objective and neutral as possible. There should at the least be a certain level of bipartisan consensus on diplomatic and national security matters. Otherwise, the prognosis for the political community called the Republic of Korea cannot be good.

There should at the least be a certain level of bipartisan consensus on diplomatic and national security

matters.